This paper analyses the dramatic increases in rice output and productivity in Vietnam due in large part to market reform, inducing farmers to work harder and use land more efficiently. The reform process is captured through changes in effort variables and a decomposition of total factor productivity (TFP) for Vietnam as a whole as well as for the north and south of the country taken separately. The results show that the more extensive the market reform the larger the increase in TFP and the share of TFP growth due to incentive effects, suggesting that more competitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly.
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of its 'doi moi' market reform process in 1981, Vietnam has achieved remarkable success in increasing the output of rice and other food products. From being a large importer of these products through the early 1980s, Vietnam has now become the second largest exporter of rice in the world, with the total output of all agricultural products more than doubling during the main period of reform from 1981 to 1994.
1 Even more notable is the fact that these gains have been achieved with a relatively modest growth of most inputs and with limited technological change, suggesting an impressive rate of growth of total factor productivity in agriculture due in large part to reform measures.
The market reform process in Vietnamese agriculture over this period has been pervasive, including a significant liberalisation of internal and external trade, greater autonomy for farmers in decision making and fundamental institutional change including the reform of the property rights regime. It is the contention of this paper that such far-reaching changes have considerably enhanced incentives for farmers to work hard and to use land more efficiently. A simple model is used to estimate the importance of these incentive effects in explaining the large increases in rice output and productivity, which were observed from 1981 to 1994.
As a whole the results are striking. Total factor productivity (TFP), which was declining at a rate of 2.4 per cent per annum in the north prior to the reforms, increased by almost 2 per cent per annum in the initial reform stage (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) and by more than 3 per cent per annum in the later stage of reforms (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . In the south, with a more recent memory of market institutions, the results were more immediate: TFP, growing at 2.3 per cent per annum prior to the reforms, grew at 4.8 per cent per annum for the initial years of reform, tapering off to a rate of 2.8 per cent per annum in the later years. In both the north and south growth due to the incentive component of TFP accelerated as reform proceeded, accounting for roughly 20 per cent of cumulative TFP growth in the early years of reform (relative to the communal regime, or prior to 'doi moi') and rising to about 60 per cent in the later years. Thus, the more extensive the degree of market reform the larger the effects on rice output and productivity, suggesting that incentives, more competitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly.
2
This paper is organised as follows. The section following provides a brief overview of the market reform process in Vietnam. The next section presents the basic model which will be used to explain the effects of market reform on rice output and productivity. The model captures market reform measures through policy induced changes in TFP and a decomposition of TFP into 1 The output of rice itself increased from 12,415 in 1981 12,415 in to 23,528 thousand tons in 1994 12,415 in (GSO, 1995 . 2 Pingali and Xuan (1992) is an early and related work shows a significant negative impact of collectivisation on productivity and rice production.
productivity changes due to enhanced incentive effects from those due to other 'unexplained' factors. 3 The parameters of the underlying production function are estimated using a provincial level panel data set for the years 1991 to 1994 in the section that follows. Resulting measures of TFP with market reform are derived over more aggregated data and then used in the penultimate section to estimate the contribution of incentive effects to productivity growth over the reform period. Any potential technological change remains (as usual) as a residual. The focus is on the years 1981-1994 for two simple reasons: first, this is the most comprehensive data set available (and especially so with regard to measures of tractors as buffalo equivalents and fertilizer, including night soil); and second, these years cover the two main periods of market reform in Vietnam. 4 The final section concludes. Appendix A indicates all data sources and the various methods used to construct specific variables in the data set and Appendix B collects technical details.
BACKGROUND
With roughly 80 per cent of the population living in rural areas in 1994 (GSO, 1995) , the agricultural sector in Vietnam, accounting for 50 per cent of material or non-service output and at least 30 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), provided employment for 72 per cent of the total labour force (GSO, 1995) . Cultivated agriculture was predominant, at 74 per cent of gross agricultural output (GSO, 1995) , especially rice production which constituted about 90 per cent of the output of food grains.
5
Given different natural conditions and prior political regimes, rice growing regions in Vietnam are designated in this paper as being in the 'north' and 'south' of the country. The north includes the provinces of the north east and north west, the Red River delta and the north central coast. Of these, the Red River delta is the principal agricultural region which roughly surrounds Hanoi. The south includes the central highlands, the south central coast, the north east of the south and the Cuu Long (Mekong) river delta. The 3 Che et al. (2001) extend the static model to the case of an intertemporal economy where incentive effects result in induced capital formation and both larger transitional growth rates and steady state values for rice output. 4 Given that the second and more extensive market reforms introduced in 1988-1994 have continued since, rice output in Vietnam has continued to increase dramatically to 31,394 thousand tons in 1999, or 33 per cent more rice output than in 1994 (SDAFF, 2001) . 5 Little has changed since 1994. At present, 80 per cent of the population still lives in rural areas and rice production accounts for roughly 92 per cent of the output of food grains (GSO, 2001 ).
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country is naturally suited for rice production, especially for the so-called 'wet rice' production. Located in a tropical area with high humidity, Vietnam benefits from an advantageous water system, with an extensive network of rivers, favourable topography and rain fall patterns. Although humid and tropical weather is predominant overall, there are still some differences between north and south. The monsoon influences the north with four different seasons, spring (march-april), summer (may-august), autumn (september-october) and winter (november-february), and the rainy season dominates the weather in the south with two seasons, the wet (junenovember) and the dry season (december-may). Periods of flood and drought are the main sources of seasonal variation in rice output.
The relevant transitional periods that correspond to the available data can be divided into the communal system (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , used as a base comparison throughout, and two principal market reform periods designated by: (a) output contracts (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) and (b) trade liberalisation (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . 6 The overall process is characterized by a move from public ownership and central planning to a form of private property and more competitive markets, with enhanced incentives to produce more and more efficiently.
In broad terms, under the communal system, virtually all of rice production was located in compulsory agricultural collectives, with all farm activities, including the choice of inputs, designated by state-planning authorities. After harvest, a portion of output was extracted by the central government. The remainder was required by law to be sold entirely to the state at low state prices (roughly 20-30 per cent of the estimated market price). Small private plots were allowed but only for the household consumption of subsidiary agricultural goods, and since individual effort was hard to accurately determine the distribution of rice within the commune was based on egalitarian criteria. As a apparent result of these controls the output of rice remained stagnant over the period 1976-1980 (falling absolutely in years 1978 and 1979) , forcing Vietnam to import large amounts of rice, roughly 1.5 million tons or 13 per cent of total food requirements per year (GSO, 1995; SDP, 1995) to meet domestic demand.
The period of output contracts corresponds to a move to de-collectivise agriculture. Plots of land were allocated to prior members of the commune and farmers were allowed to organise production activities privately, in what effectively was a tentative first move towards private property rights. Although, for the most part, rice was still required to be sold in state markets at low state prices, private domestic markets (for some portion of output sold, 6 Fforde and de Vylder (1988) and Fforde (1996) is an expert discussion on the process and rationale of transition in Vietnam in the 1980s.
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Vietnamese Rice Production roughly 20%) inevitably emerged and were condoned by state authorities. In fact, the period is generally characterised by a 'dual price' system (a low state price and a competitive market price), albeit with strict controls to prevent arbitrage opportunities between markets.
The period of trade liberalisation finally allowed for effective private property rights over both land (initially 10-15 year leases) and capital equipment. Production decisions were de-centralised, all farm income (after tax) was retained by the farmer and in 1990 the central government abolished the dual price system. Rice could now be sold on competitive domestic markets with an incentive structure that rewarded individual effort. In 1993, tenure arrangements over land were extended (to 20 year leases), provisions for the exchanging of leases and the sale of land were introduced and farmers (through voluntary cooperatives) could now sell rice freely in international markets. Table 1 gives a useful overview of the performance of the Vietnamese rice sector over this period in terms of the fitted annual rates of growth of output and inputs for the period as a whole and for each of the three stages considered above. For the communal period (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) , the north experienced a contraction in rice output of almost 4 per cent per annum, while output in the south grew at 3.4 per cent per annum, leading to almost no change for the country as a whole during this period. 7 In contrast, in the first stage of reforms (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) , output grew by nearly 4.6 per cent per annum in the south and 3.8 per cent per annum in the north (4.17 per cent for the country as a whole). In the second, trade liberalization stage of reform, output growth accelerated to 6.5 per cent annum in the south, 5.4 per cent per annum in the north and 6.11 per cent for the country as a whole. In short, output growth was higher in the second stage of reforms in both the north and the south, although the growth rates in the south were higher than those in the north for the whole period 1976-1994. This differential performance was particularly marked in the investment response of the two regions: in the latter stage of reforms, capital increased by 14.5 per cent per annum in the south compared to only 6.8 per cent per annum in the north. Apart from this 7 The nature of agricultural cooperatives differed substantially between the north and south during the communal period (Chu et al., 1992) . In the north advanced cooperatives (with detailed central plans and pooled land, labour and equipment) were dominant since 1975, covering 97 per cent of all farmers. Farmers in the south, who were familiar with the market economy, were generally more reluctant to implement state-directed agricultural cooperatives after reunification. From 1976 to 1980, the 'production cooperative' (a primitive form of a cooperative, with shared labour and equipment) was popular in the south and dominant in the Cuu Long River delta. At the end of 1980 there were 1,518 cooperatives and 9,350 production cooperatives in the south, including only 36 per cent of farmers (albeit with coverage of as many as 90 per cent of farmers in the central regions of the south). Nevertheless, differences in cooperatives aside, all output in both the north and south had to be sold to the state at low state prices during this period. 1976-1980 1981-1987 1988-1994 1976-1994 1976-1980 1981-1987 1988-1994 1976-1994 1976-1980 1981-1987 1988-1994 1976-1994 
MODEL
The technical production function The model of the effects of market reform on agricultural output is based on the seminal approach developed by McMillan et al. (1989) to analyse Chinese agriculture, extended to account for the nature of rice production and the various market reform measures introduced in Vietnam. Let e n represent the level of effort of a typical farmer so that for N workers e n N is the effective contribution of labour to output measured in 'efficiency units'. As mentioned, the value of e n can be broadly interpreted to include everything that determines the quality of the farmer's labour as well as the willingness to literally exert more effort due to the enhanced incentives that accompany market reform and the removal of externally imposed restrictions on the kinds of tasks a farmer may undertake. With security over land tenure and the freedom to manage farm production, the typical farmer may be expected to manage land-use in a way that increases the productivity of a given area. To capture this effect let L represent total sown area and let e l capture the effort associated with exploiting and managing the land. Optimal land use may involve effort directed towards increasing the number of crops sown in a given area or simply the planning involved in increasing the yield on a given amount of land. With reform, for example, it was common in Vietnam to initiate multiple cropping of rice and certainly so relative to production plans in the communal period. The total input of land measured in efficiency units is given by e l L.
Assume a 'technical' constant returns to scale production function
8 This is consistent with the empirical literature on agricultural production functions for 22 developing countries (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985) and China (Tang, 1980) . The specification is confirmed on panel data for Vietnam in section dealing with Estimation of the institutional rice production function.
where Q, L, M, and K represent output, land, material inputs (eg, fertilizer and seeds) and physical capital or, in per capita terms,
where q, l, m, k are output, land, material inputs, and capital per farmer.
The farmer's profit function
In principle, farmers may work in different institutional settings that vary from a communal system to various forms of share-contracting and private competitive markets. Let farm income received be given by
where p is the price of the agricultural good at which output is sold and d is a constant term that can be considered as the fixed rent or lump-sum tax the farmer has to deliver to the state for the right to use the property. Outside of pure communal arrangements, the value b is the fraction of the additional revenue generated that the farmer is allowed to keep, so that b can be considered as a share-cropping contract between the landlord (the State) and the farmer. 9 For our purposes, the value bp also represents an average goods price including three components defined as
where p s , p m and p w are the state price, the market-clearing price and the export price respectively and b s , b m and b w are the fractions or shares of agricultural output, that sum to one, allocated or delivered to the state, the domestic market or sold internationally. Different regimes imply different values for bp. Under the communal system, the farmer was required to sell the entire agricultural output to the State at a low state controlled price, implying that b s ¼ 1. In the output-contracts stage of reform, domestic markets existed but were still tightly controlled, with the farmer still required to sell the major share of output to the State at the low compulsory price, with the remainder to be sold on the domestic market at a higher domestic market 9 For completeness, the theoretical setting to follow assumes that the same model of profit maximisation applies to both the reform and communal periods. Nevertheless, all numerical measures developed in sections dealing with Empirical results and The contribution of incentive effects, including the calculation of incentive based TFP, focus solely on the reform periods. Observed (and averaged) values in the communal period are for the most part used simply as a starting value or basis of comparison. The idea of profit maximisation in the pre-reform period may be seen as doubtful, given that farmers were required to follow a production plan and thus given no choice over the application or use of inputs during this time.
price. No trade in international markets was allowed and arbitrage between state and domestic markets was rigorously enforced. With the period of trade liberalisation, the state market was effectively abolished, controls were largely removed from the domestic market and international trade was permitted. Rice output was allocated between domestic and world markets at higher prices, with the differential between domestic market prices and the world export price p w becoming increasingly smaller.
10
Assume the farmer chooses inputs in order to minimise costs. With constant returns to scale, minimising costs subject to equation (1) gives a total cost (TC) function
where a i are the share parameters in the technical production function, c 0 is a constant defined by i as the average (real) factor price, so that the cost function per farmer (C) can be given as
During the process of market reform, factor markets in Vietnamese agriculture changed considerably in terms of both their structure and their speed of development. In the earlier stages, some types of inputs were 'free' (such as the labour of the farmer), or unpaid, receiving only implicit or in-kind payments. With market reform such payments became explicit and it is necessary to take into account any resulting increases in input costs. In addition, more importantly, in Vietnam, as is the case in many transitional economies, factor and product prices generally increase at different rates with market reform, with changes in factor prices lagging behind the increase in product prices. To capture these effects, define o ¼ W(w)/bp as a weightedcost share parameter or the ratio of observed average factor to product prices. The farmer's profit function (p) thus becomes
using equations (3) and (7) and the definition of o.
10 Since Vietnam is a natural exporter of agricultural goods, its export price will exceed its domestic market price under autarky with free internal trade, which in turn will exceed its domestic price under tightly regulated domestic markets. All prices are higher than the state-controlled price.
Optimal behaviour and the institutional production function Following McMillan et al. (1989) , assume the farmer receives utility from income but dislikes the effort of hard work and of planning for more efficient use of land, so that
where d>0 and z>1 are constants, so that marginal disutility of effort increases with effort. The effort-disutility coefficient z is analogous to the coefficient of risk aversion and d is chosen to guarantee that the utility function is jointly concave. It is assumed that z is that same across effort variables for labour and land, although this clearly could be generalised. Substituting from equations (2) and (8) gives
Consider the farmer's optimal choice of effort levels. Maximising (10) with respect to e n and e l implies that optimal values for labour and land effort must satisfy
and
for n ¼ (zÀa 1 Àa 2 ). The measures of effective labour and effective land are thus endogenous to effective output prices and the ratio of input to effective output prices. Finally, substituting equations (11) and (12) into the per capita technical production function, or (2), and multiplying both sides by N, gives the following 'institutional' production function
where the total factor productivity coefficient A is given by
and share parameters are
for labour, land, material inputs, and capital, respectively.
The institutional production function captures the farmer's response to institutional arrangements and government policies, through changes in effective prices bp and the average ratio of input to product prices o. It is equation (13) rather than (1) that would be estimated using observable input and output data. In this equation, total factor productivity (A) and the optimal choice of effort depend both on the price level p, effective product prices bp and the ratio of average input to effective output prices o, variables which clearly differ from one stage of market reform to the next.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Estimation of the institutional rice production function
Estimates of equation (13) are based on a panel data set for rice-growing areas for the years 1991-1994, covering most of the main second stage of reforms or the period of trade liberalisation. These are the only years in which complete cross-section data are currently available for 60 provinces (excluding the 'special petroleum economic zone' or Baria-Vung Tau) in Vietnam.
11 Estimates are obtained from a general log-linear specification of the form
for x it a vector of inputs, v i an (unobserved) province-specific residual and e it BN(0, s e 2 ) as usual. All results are reported in Table 2 . A Breusch and Pagan (1980) test rejects the null hypothesis that the variance in the provincespecific variable (s v 2 ) is zero and a Hausman (1978) test fails to reject the null that province-specific errors are uncorrelated with the regressors, thus confirming the choice of a 'random effects' model (eg, Greene, 1993) given by
and time periods T. The estimated value of r is 0.1878 indicating that the random effects estimates are closer to pooled OLS rather than fixed effects estimates. 12 Share coefficients for each g or labour, land, material inputs and 11 See Appendix A for complete data sources and descriptions. 12 In trial specifications year-dummies and a deterministic time trend tested as insignificant.
Specifications with regional dummies (above province level) were also attempted to capture capital are 0.17, 0.27, 0.47, and 0.12, respectively. 13 A Wald test indicates that the hypothesis of constant returns to scale could not be rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance. The relatively high coefficient on material inputs is fully consistent with the results of research by the United Nations Development Program and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1999) showing that expenditure on chemical fertiliser in particular is the major cost component faced by farmers, at roughly 65 per cent of total variable cost (Nguyen Khiem, 1991) . In Vietnam, fertiliser is the largest component of material inputs by far.
It is important to note that estimated results for equation (17) assume that share coefficients in the institutional production function, or the value of differences in agro-climatic conditions. In one case a regional dummy for the Mekong area proved significant, but generated little change in estimated share coefficients. Results are available from the authors on request. 13 It is important to note that the calculated values (see the section dealing with The contribution of incentive effects) of the share coefficients a i in the technical production function, which directly correspond to the estimates of each g i , are roughly the same as the estimates for agricultural production obtained by Tang (1980) for China and for 22 other developing countries provided by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) .
each g i in (13), are constant throughout the period 1991-1994. There are two forms of supporting evidence for this assumption. First, breaking the sample in half and testing separately, as well as attempts with Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimates, showed no change in share coefficients over the sample period. All alternative specifications proved inferior to the random effects estimates given in Table 2 . Second, and perhaps more importantly, traditional factor shares drawn from the data set were shown to be constant throughout this period. This was verified by first calculating measures of effective units of land and labour, using equations (11) and (12), given values for effective output prices and the ratio of effective input to output prices. Next, from observed values for input prices, known increases in capital and material inputs and the calculated series for effective land and labour, it was easy to verify that relative factor shares remain unchanged and are approximately proportional to the relative value of each a i in the technical production function, or equation (1). With each a i constant it follows that each g i remains unchanged in equation (13), given z. (Details are available from the authors on request.)
A similar procedure was used over both of the two reform periods, 1981 to 1994, on aggregate not provincial data, given data limitations, showing that standard growth accounting measures of TFP using either estimated share coefficients or factor shares give roughly the same results. (Detailed calculations are also available from the authors on request.) While still allowing for technological change as an unexplained residual, the assumption that share coefficients drawn from the period 1991-1994 are constant and apply to the period of output contracts (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) can thus be seen as reasonable. The point of using the institutional production function, however, obtained after solving out for effort variables on labour and land, in the TFP calculations to follow, rather than the technical production function, is that it allows for a precise decomposition of TFP due to incentive effects as distinct from all other 'unexplained residuals', including technological change.
Total factor productivity with market reform
This section uses the market reform augmented share parameters from the above estimates of the institutional production function to derive estimates of total factor growth calculated as a Solow residual for each of the years 1981-1994. This is done using aggregate data for output and inputs summarised in Table 3 for Vietnam as a whole and the north and south of Vietnam respectively for the years 1976-1994. The annual growth rate for total factor productivity (A) is calculated in the usual 'growth accounting' manner as the difference between the growth of output and the growth of each input weighted by share parameters. The resulting estimates of the year- by-year growth rates for A are then used to calculate an index for TFP using the average of the years 1976-1980 in the communal period as the base. These figures are summarised in Table 4 . Average fitted annual growth rates are also given for the communal regime (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) and for each of the two main reform stages: output contracts (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) and trade liberalisation (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . The results are revealing. Under the communal regime, TFP growth was low for the country as a whole (0.77 per cent per annum) and was significantly negative for the north (a fall of 2.36 per cent per annum). On the other hand, even under the communal regime, the south managed an annual rate of TFP growth of 2.28 per cent. In addition, TFP in the south responded much more rapidly than the north to the earlier reforms, achieving an annual growth rate of TFP in the years 1981-1987 of 4.77 per cent. In contrast, the north achieved a TFP growth of less than 2 per cent per annum in this period. Interestingly, the south's annual rate of TFP growth tapered off in the second stage of reform, whereas that of the north increased to over 3 per cent per annum.
This seems to suggest that in the south, where the push for trade liberalisation was more determined and the experience of market institutions was more recent, farmers were able to adapt and seize opportunities much Note: Annual growth rate is measured as the fitted values of the exponential growth rate more quickly when the first reforms arrived. Thus, much of the TFP growth in the south was achieved early, whereas it was not until the later market liberalisation stage that the north was able to achieve a reasonable level of TFP growth. This is not to suggest that the growth of rice output slowed down in the south during the second stage of reform, just that the main gains in TFP were achieved early. In fact, as shown in Table 1 , the latter stage of reform in the south was still marked by a dramatic increase in rice output, at a growth rate of 6.55 per cent. It is usual in studies of this kind to attempt to explain the sources of TFP growth. However, in the case of Vietnam this is difficult. In particular, there are no reliable figures for human capital and the extent of technological change, potentially large factors in productivity improvement. However, we are able to directly estimate the incentive component of TFP and its relative contribution to growth since the beginning of the reform process. While this may be a poor substitute for direct observation of human capital accumulation and the use of new technical methods to produce rice, it does provide us with an estimable measure of productivity change that can be directly related to policy, or market reform, through changes in the 'institutional' parameters bp and (1Àc 0 o). Accordingly, we now consider the relative importance of these incentive effects in Vietnamese TFP growth for rice.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF INCENTIVE EFFECTS
In this section, the institutional production function estimated in the section describing Estimation of the institutional rice production function is used to decompose TFP (A), given equation (14), into two components; the first attributable to incentive effects as captured in the effort variables, or
and the second
as an 'unexplained residual' reflecting the influence of a host of other factors, including technological change, where
, a 1 and a 2 are all known (or can be calculated) and are assumed to be time invariant, a 0 will change over time. With the available data set, its time path cannot be estimated and thus we cannot directly estimate the time path of A 0 . However, the time path of A has already been estimated as a Solow residual (section dealing with Total factor productivity with market reform) and we have time series data for the 'institutional variables' bp and c 0 o (Table 5 ) so that a time path for the incentive component of TFP or A 1 can be estimated, based on the series for effective output prices and the ratio of input to effective output prices. Appendix B calculates the value of z ¼ 3 (with sensitivity results noted below) and the share coefficients in the technical production function, which are a 1 ¼0.32 for labour, a 2 ¼ 0.22 land, a 3 ¼ 0.39 for material inputs and a 1 ¼0.10 for capital. 14 The value of c 0 in equation (7) is 1.4 and the exponential term in equation (20) is 0.22. Data sources and the method for constructing the time series for the average rice price bp and o are given in Appendix A.
Using all information, the resulting series for A 1 is given in Table 5 (indexed to the communal period, 1976-1980 ¼100). The proportional growth rate of A 1 is
and Table 5 makes it clear that output prices increased much more quickly than input prices. 15 Table 5 also replicates the index of TFP or A given in Table  4 and calculates the proportion of cumulative TFP growth relative to the communal regime (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) accounted for by the incentive component. This proportion changes considerably from year to year; however, it is clear from Table 5 that, on average, the incentive component of growth is a larger proportion of overall TFP growth in the second stage of reform (trade liberalisation, 1988-1994) than in the earlier stage (the output-contracts stage, 1981-1987) . This higher relative contribution of the incentive effect to overall TFP growth in the later years of reform is observed for Vietnam as a whole and for the north and the south respectively. 16 It is also notable that the 14 As mentioned, given the relative importance of fertiliser in rice production, the share parameters for Vietnam do not differ much from the estimates for agricultural production obtained by Tang (1980) for China (0.50 for labour, 0.25 for land, 0.15 for material inputs and 0.10 for capital) and for 22 other developing countries (respectively, 0.53, 0.10, 0.16, and 0.21) reported by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) . The difference in the estimates for labour in Vietnam may be explained by the use of labour work days rather than (the unavailable) work hours. 15 With market reform the price of fertiliser actually fell in Vietnam from 1984 to 1994 (FAO, 1999 . 16 Sensitivity results on the effort disutility coefficient z ¼ 3 imply small variations in the growth rate of A 1 . For z ¼ 2.8, the resulting growth rate of A 1 Vietnam as a whole is 1.03 in the period of output contracts and 3.10 with trade liberalisation. The comparable figures for the north and south are 1.33, 2.47 and 0.83, 3.62, respectively. For z ¼ 3.2, the resulting growth rate in Vietnam as a whole is 0.86 in the period of output contracts and 2.66 with trade liberalisation. For the north and south the values are 1.12, 2.12 and 0.70, 3.11, respectively. annual rate of increase of A 1 is uniformly higher for the second stage of reform than the first (increasing from 0.94 to 2.86 per cent per annum for the country as a whole).
The relationship between the incentive component of TFP and total TFP is illustrated for Vietnam as a whole in Figures 1 and 2 , which graphs 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Stage 1 1976-80 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 TFP Incentive component
TFP index Stage 1 Stage 2
Figure 1: Indices of total factor productivity in Vietnamese rice production (1976-1980 ¼ 100) the time paths of the indices of A (TFP) and A 1 (the incentive component) and the proportion of A 1 to A respectively. The diagrams are not intended to show any absolute relationship between A and A 1 because both indices are set equal to 100 in the initial period (the communal regime). Rather, the graphs illustrate the cumulative growth of the incentive component relative to the cumulative growth of TFP. The bold vertical line in the middle of both figures marks the switch from the output-contracts to the trade liberalisation regime in 1987. The transition to a more extensive market reform regime is thus seen to result in a rapid increase in both TFP and the incentive component of TFP. Moreover, after 1987, cumulative growth due to the incentive effect rises steadily from just over one-third of cumulative TFP growth in 1987 to three-fifths of cumulative TFP growth in 1994.
CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on the effects of the reforms that have occurred in Vietnamese rice production since 1980. A simple model is used to consider optimising behaviour by farmers based on an 'institutional' production function, which reflects not only the usual technical relationship between inputs and outputs, but also effort responses to the institutional and market arrangements within which farmers work. Assuming farmers choose their effort levels optimally, it is possible to estimate these 'incentive effects' at each stage of reform and compare them with the overall change in total factor productivity. Results show that this incentive component represents a higher proportion of post-1980 total factor productivity growth for the later trade liberalisation stage of reform than for the earlier, more reform-limited output contracts stage. We also observe an earlier response of productivity to reform in the south than in the north, conceivably because of the more recent experience of market institutions in the south. The overall results confirm that the more extensive is market reform the larger the increase in TFP and the share of TFP growth due to incentive effects, suggesting that more competitive markets and secure property rights matter greatly. The panel data used for estimation of the institutional rice production function, equation (13), is cross-sectional for 60 provinces over the years 1991-1994 and is obtained from the National Investigation of Rural Regions (SDAFF, 2001; GSO, 1995b) . A rice equivalent for output is chosen rather than rice output alone since in the same rice fields farmers usually overlap production with other short-term cereal crops, such as sweet potatoes and maize. Time series data for rice output is from SDAFF (1991) and MAFI (1995) for the period 1976 -1990 , from SDAFF (1995a ) for 1990 -1993 and from GSO (1995 for 1994.
Labour is measured as person-days and is obtained by multiplying average person-days per hectare in agriculture (SRF, various issues) by the rice cultivated area (SDAFF (1991 (SDAFF ( , 1992 (SDAFF ( , 1995b , MAFI (1991) , GSO (1995) ). The data for rice as sown area is drawn from the National Investigation of Rural Regions in Vietnam, reported by the GSO (1995) .
The land input is measured as the sown area of rice, obtained from SDAFF (1991, 1995a) , MAFI (1991) and GSO (1995) . Capital inputs are obtained as a weighted sum of draught animals (SDAFF (1992 (SDAFF ( , 1995a , MAFI (1991) and GSO (1995) ) and tractors (SDAFF, 1996) . The conversion from the number of draught animals to tractor capacity is based on (Blomqvist, 1986) and assumes that a bullock-day (a pair of bullock working 8 hours) is approximately the same as a tractor-hour at 15 to 25 horsepower. Total capital input for rice production is then derived as the total capital input for cultivation multiplied by the proportional share of rice cultivated area to the total cultivated area of agriculture.
Material inputs include the nutrition content of all fertilisers (organic and chemical), insecticides and seeds (Tang, 1980; Sicular, 1988) . The conversion factor used to aggregate organic and chemical fertilisers is similar to that used by Tang (1980:61) . Since green manure data are not available, organic fertiliser data is obtained by aggregating estimates of night soil (based on rural population data) and large animal manure (buffaloes, cattle and pigs) from SDAFF (1992, 1995a) , MAFI (1995) and GSO (1995) . Populationadjusted night-soil equals the rural population (GSO, 1995) multiplied by a rural utilisation rate (0.9). The standard number of large animals equals the sum of buffaloes, cattle and pigs (GSO, 1994) for which the weighted ratios are 1, 1 and 0.33 respectively.
The time series for chemical fertilisers is calculated from the average amounts of chemical fertiliser used per hectare (SRF, 1994) multiplied by cultivated area in each year (SDAFF, 1996) . The series data for insecticides and seeds are calculated from the average use of insecticide and seeds per hectare (SDAFF, 1996) multiplied by rice area for each year. The derived data are consistent with a study done by the World Bank (1994). A figure for total material inputs is obtained by aggregating fertiliser, insecticide and seeds using the weights in Sicular (1988) .
The value of b, equation (4), in the output contracts stage of reform is set at a market share of 0.8, 0.2 and zero for the state, domestic and international market. This is average data computed from the GSO (1994) years in which the market share is 0. 88, 0.12 (in 1985), 0.82, 0.18 (in 1986) and 0.82, 0.18 (in 1987) for state and domestic markets for grains. Research by the State Planning Committee in 1995 also used the rate 0.8, 0.2 to adjust the multiple prices for grain at this time. In the stage of trade liberalisation, the share of output sold to the state was clearly zero, with the share between domestic and international markets was obtained from average GSO data from 1988 GSO data from -1994 Time series data for nominal rice prices for 1976-1994 was obtained from the State Department of Price (SDP, 1995) . These prices are multiplied by the appropriate values of b as in equation (4) to obtain an average nominal rice price. To convert this to an average real price, it would normally be usual to deflate by the consumer price index. However, in the case of Vietnam, such price indices are highly volatile and unreliable due largely to poor and erratic construction methods (see Che, 1997, pp. 190-203) . Under the circumstances, a more reliable measure of the underlying rate of inflation is the Dong/US dollar exchange rate which is used here as the deflator for bp. This is in line with the high correlation between the Vietnamese inflation rate and the ratio Dong/$US noted by the World Bank (1994, pp. 67-68) and is a measure commonly used by the Vietnamese (especially so during periods of high inflation). Following the practice of the State Department of Price (SDP), the nominal rice price in Nam Dinh and Can Tho is taken to represent the rice price in the north and south respectively.
With the absence of well-developed markets for inputs in transitional economies, input prices are difficult to obtain and interpret. In Vietnam in fact the market for material inputs developed more quickly than that for labour and especially land. Input prices in equation (7) used to construct the weighted-cost share parameter o, are measured in rice units or, for example, how many tons of rice farmers have to pay to get one ton of urea, to employ one thousand labour work-days, or to rent one hectare of land. All measures were complied in a consistent manner throughout the sample period. Details are contained in Che (1997) . It is also important to note that many official data sources for input expenditures are already measured in terms of rice units as a matter of practice. The time-series data for the relative price of urea to rice are drawn from the Central Price Committee (CPC), as reported in Nguyen Hien (1991) and Nguyen Khiem (1995) .
APPENDIX B: CALCULATION OF THE EFFORT-DISUTILITY COEFFICIENT AND SHARE PARAMETERS IN THE TECHNICAL PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Given the relationship that exists between the share parameters in the technical and institutional production function, equations (15) and (16), it is straightforward to calculate the estimated values of a i from the values of g i and the work-disutility coefficient z. Following McMillan et al. (1989, p. 793) , the effort disutility coefficient, although unobservable, can be derived directly from equation (14) with a knowledge of bp. To simplify, calculate z from the approximate growth rate of A in two contiguous years during the communal system and within a given reform period, where the average weighted-cost share parameter o and b are the same. The years 1978-1979 and 1982-1983 roughly correspond. Using values for bp from Table 5 , and given the estimated value of the proportional growth in total factor productivity from the section dealing with Total factor productivity with market reform, z can be shown to range from 2.8 to 3.2. A value of z ¼ 3 is chosen for all calculations. The approximate values of the share parameters in the technical production function (solving simultaneously) are thus a 1 ¼0.32, a 2 ¼ 0.22, a 3 ¼ 0.39 and a 4 ¼ 0.10 for labour, land, material inputs and capital respectively. Given equation (6) the value of c 0 is thus 3.65. It is worth noting that writing the cost function in terms of institutional parameters g results only in a slight change in c 0 to 3.52.
